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Abstract:  We examine whether the information content of earnings is inversely related to the 
degree of conformity between financial accounting income and taxable income.  Our inquiry 
exploits a natural experiment first examined by Guenther et al. (1997) in which a set of U.S. 
firms were forced to increase their book-tax conformity as a result of a change in the tax law.  
We find evidence consistent with the increase in book-tax conformity reducing the usefulness 
of financial accounting earnings.  The information content of earnings as measured by the 
long-window earnings response coefficients and the R-squared from a regression of returns on 
earnings decreases for this set of firms after the tax law required greater book-tax conformity.  
We find that the declines are significantly larger than the changes in the same measures for an 
industry-matched sample of firms not required to increase conformity.   These results add to 
the academic literature on the interaction of taxes and financial reporting as well as to the 
policy debate about whether the U.S. should conform the tax law to GAAP, a debate that has 
recently intensified.   
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Book-Tax Conformity and the Information Content of Earnings  
 
1. Introduction 
This paper examines the effect of book-tax conformity on the information content of 
financial accounting earnings.  We use a natural experiment first examined by Guenther, 
Maydew, and Nutter (1997, hereafter GMN) in which a set of publicly traded firms were 
required to switch for tax purposes from the cash method of accounting to the accrual method 
thereby increasing the level of conformity between book and taxable incomes.  GMN find that 
after the required change in the tax rules these firms deferred more income for financial 
reporting purposes because of the increased trade-off between financial accounting and tax.  
In other words, once the two incomes were more closely aligned, the firms reported lower 
financial accounting earnings, all else constant, in order to save (defer) tax dollars.    
Book-tax conformity and its effects on the information content of reported earnings is 
an important topic of inquiry to both policy makers and academic researchers.  The difference 
between reported book and taxable incomes grew substantially in the 1990s according to 
estimates made by several governmental agencies and researchers (e.g., Plesko, 2000 and 
2002; Treasury, 1999).  While the reason for this divergence is not known with certainty, 
many argue that one or both of the income measures were being opportunistically reported by 
management.  One suggestion to curb this behavior has been to conform the two income 
measures into one, thereby forcing firms to trade-off high accounting earnings against lower 
taxes, which some believe would discourage aggressive financial and tax reporting.  For 
example, one commentator states “The [book-tax] gap can and should be narrowed…The 
result would be a stronger incentive for companies to tell it like it is.  If executives want to 
overstate income to fool shareholders, they’ll pay higher taxes as a result.  If they are tempted 
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to understate income in order to escape taxes, they’ll suffer with their shareholders.  That kind 
of change in incentives would do far more to clean up corporate accounting than any amount 
of regulatory oversight” (Murray 2002).   John Buckley, Democratic tax council for the House 
Ways and Means Committee, claimed: “If you had greater book/tax conformity, Enron 
probably would never have happened” (Carnahan and Novack 2002).  Indeed, increased 
book-tax conformity was one of the alternatives considered by President Bush’s Tax Reform 
Panel.1  The Panel’s report states that “The Panel also evaluated a proposal to tax large 
entities based on net income reported on financial statements instead of requiring a separate 
calculation of income tax purposes.  Although the Panel has decided not to include that 
proposal as part of the Simplified Income Tax Plan, the Panel recommends that it be studied 
further” (page 131).  
While it is possible that book-tax conformity could be a partial cure for some 
problems of aggressive tax and financial reporting, book-tax conformity could have severe 
unintended consequences, rendering the cure more damaging than the disease.  One 
unintended consequence is how firms respond to book-tax conformity in reporting their 
income and then how investors will use the new earnings number that is reported.  GMN 
investigate the former and report that firms deferred income in their financial accounting 
reporting in response to a change in the tax law that required more conformity.  We examine 
the latter, how investors use this new earnings information – is it more or less informative to 
the market? 
It is important to note here what we mean by book-tax conformity.  There are several 
methods by which conformity can be implemented.  One could conform tax to follow book 
rules either partially (the case in our paper’s setting because some, but not all, items are 
                                                 
1 See Harris (2005) and Graetzk (2005).   
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accrued in the same manner for book and for tax) or more completely (which is similar to the 
proposals considered recently).2  Alternatively, as in some foreign countries, one could 
conform book to tax so that the tax rules determine book rules.  In our setting some may 
question why the value relevance of the accounting data would change if the financial 
accounting rules stay the same and the tax rules change (i.e., it is not financial accounting that 
is conforming to tax rules).  The reasoning is as follows.  Even if the financial accounting 
rules do not explicitly change, how the same rules are applied by firms will change in order to 
minimize taxes and increase after tax cash flows to shareholders.  Indeed, GMN report results 
consistent with firms changing their financial reporting where an increase in conformity was 
required even though the financial accounting rules did not change.  
How taxes affect financial reporting has been the subject of extensive research (see 
Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) for a review).  In settings with a high degree of book-tax 
conformity, deferral of taxable income can lead to tax-induced lower financial accounting 
income (i.e., tax-induced conservatism).  Prior studies obtain variation in book-tax conformity 
by looking across countries (for example, Ball, Kothari, and Robin, 2000; Guenther and 
Young, 2000).  These studies report that the informativeness of earnings is lower in countries 
with a high degree of book-tax conformity than it is in countries with little book-tax 
conformity.  This paper holds the country constant (i.e., the United States) and obtains 
                                                 
2 For example, in TRA 86 the requirement to switch to the accrual basis for tax purposes for the firms previously 
on the cash basis involved a switch to the accrual basis for non-inventory sales (e.g., accounts receivable) and 
payables (e.g., accounts payable).  However, as under the current system, accounting for items like warranty 
reserve or bad debt reserve remained on the cash basis.  Thus, we label this partially conformed – where the tax 
books are a hybrid cash basis and accrual basis rather than a pure cash basis (except for inventory related 
revenue and expenses) as they were prior to TRA 86.  The accrual basis firms (the control firms in our tests) are 
also hybrid cash and accrual in a similar manner (and all firms are still today if they have sales in excess of $5 
million). GMN provide an example of the magnitude of such conformity can be.  In the 1996 US Tax Court case 
of Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) (TC Memo 1996-105) the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) attempted 
to force HCA to use the (hybrid) accrual method for the period 1981-1986 rather than the cash method that the 
firm was using for tax purposes.  Over the six year period the IRS computed that the use of the accrual method 
would increase taxable income by a total of $588 million.  HCA’s pre-tax financial statement earnings over this 
same period were approximately $2,142 million (GMN page 226). 
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variation in book-tax conformity by examining a natural experiment in which a set of firms 
was required to increase their book-tax conformity as a result of a change in the tax law.  The 
sample consists of firms originally identified in GMN that were required to switch for tax 
purposes from the cash method to the accrual method (hereafter referred to as cash basis 
firms) as a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86). Before they were required to 
switch, these firms faced relatively low levels of book-tax conformity because they used the 
accrual method for financial reporting purposes but the cash method for tax purposes.  Once 
they were required to use the accrual method for both book and tax purposes, their degree of 
book-tax conformity increased.   
We test the implications of increased book-tax conformity (and the resulting change in 
financial reporting income) for the information content of earnings using two different 
methods.  We examine both long-window earnings response coefficients and the R2s from 
regressions of returns on earnings.  Because any results obtained from testing the information 
content of earnings using these methods for the cash basis firms before TRA 86 compared to 
after TRA 86 could be due to other factors that affected all firms during that time period, we 
obtain a ‘matched’ set of firms from the same four-digit industries (SIC codes) as the cash 
basis firms (hereafter, accrual basis firms).  We then employ a difference-in-differences 
approach comparing the cash basis firms before and after TRA 86 to the accrual basis firms 
before and after TRA 86.  We find evidence consistent with earnings becoming less useful to 
the market for the cash basis firms and this decrease being significantly different from the 
observed change for the accrual basis sample.  Both the long window ERC and the R2s from 
regressions of returns on earnings decline for the cash basis firms and significantly more so 
than for the accrual basis firms.  These results are robust to different measures of earnings 
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(earnings before extraordinary items and pre-tax earnings) and to the inclusion of other 
control variables in the ERC regressions.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section we review the prior literature, with 
specific attention to the sample, tests, and findings of GMN.  In section 3 we develop our 
hypothesis.  In section 4 we discuss our sample, variable measurement, and empirical tests.  
Section 5 presents our results and section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Related Research  
2.1 Guenther, Maydew, and Nutter (1997) 
 GMN examine the impact of book-tax conformity on firms’ financial reporting and tax 
planning activities.  They identify a small set of publicly traded firms (66 firms with available 
data) that prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86) were allowed to use the cash method 
of accounting (other than for purchases and sales of inventory items) for tax purposes and the 
accrual method of accounting for financial reporting purposes.  As a result, for these firms the 
year-end acceleration of financial statement income imposed no tax costs as long as cash 
collections were not also accelerated.  In addition, by deferring (accelerating) cash collections 
(payments) firms could defer taxable income without affecting book income.  TRA 86 
required large firms (sales in excess of $5 million) to use the accrual accounting method for 
tax purposes, strengthening the degree of book-tax conformity for these firms. 
 GMN show that the cash basis firms recognized (reported) book income sooner than 
accrual basis firms prior to TRA 86.  Specifically, GMN examine three financial statement 
ratios indicative of the degree to which firms accelerate or defer earnings and cash flows: 1) 
the ratio of accounts receivable to accounts payable, which they interpret as an overall 
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measure of accrual and/or cash flow management, 2) the ratio of cash receipts to cash 
disbursements, their measure of receipts and payments management, and 3) the ratio of sales 
to expenses (both measured under the accrual method for financial reporting), their measure 
of revenue and expense management. They compare the cash firms to a matched set of 
accrual firms (matched by 4 digit industry membership) prior to TRA 86 and then compare 
how the cash basis firms changed their financial reporting after TRA 86 relative to the accrual 
basis firms.  
 Using both univariate and multivariate analysis, GMN report results generally 
consistent with their hypotheses that cash basis firms recognized greater income before TRA 
86 and that they decreased the level of revenue recognized relative to the accrual basis firms 
after TRA 86.  More specifically, prior to TRA 86 the cash basis firms had significantly 
higher ratios of accounts receivable to accounts payable and sales to expenses, indicating that 
the cash basis firms accrued revenues and deferred expenses to a greater degree than did the 
accrual basis firms.  GMN also find that the cash basis firms reduced these same ratios to a 
greater extent than the accrual basis firms after TRA 86, indicative of a greater decrease in the 
acceleration of income and deferral of expenses as a result of the tax costs of these actions 
constraining this behavior.  The authors conduct robustness checks for self-selection (because 
the group of cash basis firms chose to use the cash method of accounting for tax purposes 
prior to TRA 86), profitability, and growth and report results inconsistent with these factors 
adversely affecting the results of their empirical tests.  Overall, GMN conclude that their 
results suggest that increasing the extent of book-tax conformity causes firms to defer 
financial statement income. 
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2.2 Other Related Research 
Watts (2003a, b) argues that there are four economic determinants of conservatism; 
contracting, litigation, regulation, and taxation. Conservative accounting generally requires a 
higher degree of verification to recognize good news as gains than to recognize bad news as 
losses (Basu 1997, Watts 2003a, b).  By tax-induced conservatism we are referring to 
unconditional conservatism in the overall reporting of income and balance sheet accounts 
rather than conditional conservatism (i.e., conditional upon a loss occurring then the 
accounting system recognizing that particular loss sooner rather than later, or in other words 
more timely recognition of economic losses).  Watts (2003a, b) predicts and GMN provide 
evidence that unconditional conservatism is greater with higher levels of book-tax conformity 
because firms will report a lower book income in order to minimize their taxes.  However, 
tax-induced conservatism is a response to tax policy and tax laws rather than an effort on the 
part of management to report economic losses in a more timely fashion to provide investors 
more information or ward off potential investor litigation. Thus, what tax-induced 
conservatism means for the usefulness of the earnings number is unclear.   
Some indirect evidence is provided on our research question by Hanlon, Laplante and 
Shevlin (2005; hereafter HLS).  HLS, using a large sample of U.S. firms, predict and find that 
financial accounting earnings provide more information (i.e., exhibit greater relative 
information content) to the market than estimated taxable income but that both income 
measures provide incremental information to investors.  Thus, they argue that if book and 
taxable incomes are conformed to one measure, the capital markets in the U.S. will suffer an 
information loss.  Further, they argue that if book income is conformed to follow the tax rules, 
they estimate a loss of approximately 50% of the current explanatory power of earnings.  
 8
However, because HLS base this 50% loss on the likely premise that the conformed income 
measure will be very similar to today’s taxable income measure, their evidence is necessarily 
indirect in nature (i.e., we do not know exactly what income number these firms would report 
if book and taxable incomes were conformed).  Note also that HLS have to estimate taxable 
income from financial statement information which raises concerns about measurement error 
in their taxable income estimate.  In contrast, our study examines financial accounting 
earnings for a set of firms where an increase in conformity was required, thus eliminating the 
need to estimate taxable income. 
We also note two other cases where sub-samples of firms have been affected by an 
increase in conformity as a result of tax law changes in the U.S.  One case was the 
implementation of the Alternative Minimum Tax in 1986, which required a link to book 
income in the calculation of the alternative tax.  However, the evidence on whether this 
affected firms’ financial reporting behavior is mixed (see Gramlich 1991, Dhaliwal and Wang 
1992, and Choi et al. 1998) and there is no study to our knowledge that investigated changes 
in the information content of earnings surrounding the implementation of the AMT book-tax 
link.3 Another example is the LIFO conformity rules.  While much of the early evidence was 
mixed on the market reaction to a LIFO adoption, Kang (1993) and Hand (1993) provide 
plausible explanations for the observed negative reaction for LIFO adoptions: firms that adopt 
LIFO expect input prices to rise.  However, to our knowledge there is no study that examines 
the information content of earnings surrounding the implementation of the LIFO conformity 
                                                 
3 Testing for information content changes related to the AMT book-tax link is problematic.  In addition to the 
mixed evidence on whether the AMT Book Income Adjustment (AMTBIA) actually led firms to change their 
reported income, an additional problem is ex ante identifying firms likely affected by the AMTBIA, which then 
adjusted their reported income.  Ex post identification (from references by firms themselves to being subject to 
the AMTBIA) also is problematic in that these are firms that did (or could not) avoid the AMTBIA.  In either 
sample identification approach, the tests are likely low power. 
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rules.4 Because the income effect of being on LIFO must be disclosed in the firm’s financial 
statements, the loss in information content because of conformity in this case is likely not 
comparable to other types of book-tax conformity requirements where disclosure of the low 
conformity outcome is not required.  An increase in book-tax conformity that affected firms’ 
reported earnings has been identified for a small sample of firms by GMN.  This small sample 
of firms from GMN offers a unique opportunity to study the capital market effects of 
requiring an increase in book-tax conformity in a U.S. setting.   
 Although the U.S. has not implemented a regime that closely links the two income 
measures, and thus large sample evidence is unavailable using U.S. data, several international 
studies have examined these issues.  Ali and Hwang (2000) examine the relation between 
measures of information content of financial accounting data and several country specific 
factors. The country specific factors examined by Ali and Hwang (2000) include the degree to 
which tax rules influence financial accounting measurements, the involvement of a private 
sector body in the standard setting process, and whether the country has a bank-oriented or 
market-oriented financial system. Ali and Hwang (2000) find that the information content of 
earnings is lower when tax rules significantly influence financial accounting measurements. 
This result is consistent with tax laws being influenced by political, social, and economic 
objectives rather than the information needs of investors. This evidence would lead to the 
                                                 
4 We recognize that there are studies that investigate earnings-price ratios for LIFO versus non-LIFO firms (e.g., 
Lee 1988 and Dhaliwal, Guenther, and Trombley 1999).  These papers use the economic intuition as stated by 
Lee (1988) that in a LIFO firm “…each dollar of current pretax cash flow should lead to higher accounting 
earnings, higher tax payments and lower stock price under the FIFO rather than the LIFO method of inventory 
costing.  Hence, the earnings/price ratios of the FIFO firms should be higher than those of LIFO firms.”  This is 
different than the information content of earnings we study here which is more of a test of whether a firm’s 
reported earnings constitute a better measure of economic earnings or performance than under an alternative 
computation of earnings (in our case unconformed incomes as compared to conformed).    
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prediction that if book and tax incomes are conformed in the U.S., there would be a loss of 
value-relevant information in the capital markets. 5   
  Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) also find that valuation in code-oriented countries 
(i.e., where tax and book incomes are very closely linked) is much less related to reported 
earnings, consistent with the findings of Ali and Hwang (2000).  Similarly, Guenther and 
Young (2000) report evidence consistent with accounting earnings in the U.K. and the U.S. 
being more closely related to underlying economic activity than accounting earnings in 
France and Germany.  They predict these results because of differences in legal systems and 
the demand for accounting information, differences in legal protection for external 
stakeholders, and differences in the degree of tax conformity in the different countries.6 
However, using international data does not directly answer the question of what would 
happen in the U.S. because earnings quality is an endogenous function of market demands, 
political influences, and the incentives of involved parties that are specific to each country 
(Ball, Robin, and Wu 2003).  Thus, we examine the question directly using a unique set of 
U.S. firms at a time when their level of book-tax conformity increased as a result of a tax law 
change. 
                                                 
5 In addition, Harris, Lang, and Moller (1994) examine the value relevance of German accounting measures over 
a period in which the German accounting rules were considered by many to be particularly deficient in the 
information disclosed to investors.  The German system included a closer link between book and taxable 
incomes, and a greater emphasis on both detailed prescriptive regulations and the needs of debtholders.  Harris et 
al. (1994) also examine an earnings number calculated by the German financial analyst society, which was 
meant to represent the “permanent earnings” of the companies.  The study reports that the correlation between 
18-month returns and annual earnings for German firms is generally similar to that in the U.S. They also report 
that the earnings number produced by the analysts have more explanatory power for returns relative to the 
reported earnings, thus providing an example of an alternative form of information acquisition that arises when 
financial accounting does not provide the type of information demanded by investors (i.e., analyst groups 
calculating alternative measures of earnings).   
6 In another study, Young and Guenther (2003) use the degree of book-tax conformity as one of two proxies for 
the informativeness of financial accounting in a country (low book-tax conformity, higher informativeness) and 
test whether capital flows into a country are decreasing with increased book-tax conformity.  Their results are 
consistent with this prediction.  Thus, another cost of book-tax conformity documented by Young and Guenther 
(2003) is decreased capital mobility.  
 11
 We note that there have also been several recent studies regarding book-tax 
differences and earnings quality.  Although not directly related, a discussion regarding how 
those studies relate to our predictions and findings is warranted.  One example is Hanlon 
(2005) which presents results consistent with firms having relatively large book-tax 
differences in a cross-section of firms also having lower earnings persistence.  Thus, one may 
be tempted to believe that if we just eliminate these differences and conform book and taxable 
income that earnings quality will improve because firms will not be able to manage earnings 
anymore.  However, this presumes that the majority of book-tax differences are driven by 
earnings management of book income on which firms could avoid paying taxes.  As stated in 
Hanlon (2005) there are many reasons why firms can have book-tax differences—1) different 
rules governing the calculation of the incomes because the two measures are intended for 
different purposes, 2) firms being tax aggressive, 3) firms managing earnings, and 4) a 
combination of these factors. Thus, if prior to TRA 86 the cash basis firms were 
opportunistically reporting financial accounting earnings and then could not do so after TRA 
86 because of the tax constraint and they did not manage financial accounting earnings 
downward after TRA 86 in spite of the tax incentives to do so, we would likely see an 
increase in the information content of earnings after TRA 86.  However, because there are 
many reasons for the book-tax differences to exist (both prior to and after TRA 86) and there 
was likely a behavioral response by firms after the required increase in conformity to attempt 
to manage financial accounting earnings downward (the market knew their conformity 
increased and lowering book income would reduce taxes and increase cash flows) this setting 
is not the same as that in Hanlon (2005).7   
 
                                                 
7 See also Lev and Nissim (2004) for a closely related paper to Hanlon (2005). 
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3. Hypothesis Development 
 Financial accounting income is reported under Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) and is intended to provide outside stakeholders (investors, creditors, 
regulators, etc.) with reliable and relevant information regarding firm performance.  In 
contrast, taxable income is calculated in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to 
determine corporate tax liabilities.  The objectives of the IRC are to provide a framework for 
efficient and equitable determination of tax liabilities and subsequent collection of revenue, 
and to provide incentives for firms to engage in, or not engage in, particular activities, and to 
reward particular constituencies (Scholes et al. 2005; Manzon and Plesko 2002).   
 GAAP provides managers with considerable discretion in their choice of accounting 
procedures (Watts and Zimmerman 1986, p. 215).  Accruals can be used by management to 
convey private information useful to external stakeholders (Dechow 1994) but they can also 
be used opportunistically.  HLS argue that conforming book income and taxable income 
would reduce the information content of earnings because managers would report earnings to 
minimize taxes thereby losing the means by which to convey relevant and reliable information 
regarding firm performance through earnings.  As a result, investors would have to get this 
information elsewhere (and this information acquisition would be costly).  Thus, our 
hypothesis is as follows:   
H1: The information content of earnings for the cash basis firms decreases after TRA 86.   
  The alternative hypothesis is that managers use the accruals process opportunistically 
to such a great degree that the information content of earnings does not decline after the 
required increase in book-tax conformity.  The argument is that under greater conformity, 
managers would be forced to balance the trade-off between reporting for tax and book and 
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thus the earnings would be more representative of actual firm performance and thereby more 
informative (Desai 2005).8 
  
4. Sample, Descriptive Statistics, and Empirical Design 
4.1 Sample 
Our sample selection criteria are described in Table 1.  We begin with the sample of 
94 firms identified by GMN as using the cash basis of accounting for tax purposes prior to 
TRA 86.9 We delete observations with missing data for our tests, firms with fiscal year end 
changes, and firms which have 1985 sales of $5 million or less because firms with less than 
$5 million in sales were not required to change accounting methods under TRA 86.10  We also 
require firms to have available data in at least both the years 1985 and 1988 to be retained in 
the sample. Our final sample consists of 56 firms that used the cash method for tax purposes 
prior to TRA 86 and were then required to switch to the accrual for tax purposes.  We refer to 
these firms as the “cash basis firms.”  We also gather a sample of what are essentially control 
firms from the same four digit SIC codes that used the accrual method for tax purposes during 
the entire period of the study; referred to as the “accrual basis firms.”  We include firm-years 
with available data in the time period from 1981-1985 for the pre-TRA 86 period and firm-
years with available data in the time period from 1988-1992 for the post-TRA 86 period.   
Because our hypothesis is concerned with the relation between returns and earnings our tests 
                                                 
8 We note in information content tests comparing cash flows and accounting earnings, accounting earnings 
exhibits greater relative information content than cash flows (Dechow 1994) in spite of this potential for earnings 
management.  Taxable income is generally based on accrual concepts but some of the rules for revenue 
recognition are based on cash flows such that taxable income is a mixture of accrual and cash flow basis of 
computing income (HLS (2005)).     
9 GMN use a keyword search of financial statement tax footnotes on the NAARS file of the LEXIS/NEXIS data 
base for 1985 using the terms ‘cash basis’ and ‘cash method’.  They exclude firms in the commercial banking 
and savings and loan industries because these firms have special tax and financial accounting rules not 
applicable to the majority of firms.     
10 IRC §448. 
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are conducted on firm-years rather than an average of data over the years for a firm (as in 
GMN).   In total, we have 3,576 firm-years of data consisting of 450 cash basis firm-years and 
3,126 accrual basis firm-years. 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for the sample. Our measure of earnings is the 
change in earnings before extraordinary items (∆E, Compustat data #18) from year t-1 to year 
t, scaled by the market value of equity (MVE, data #199 * data #25) at the end of year t-1.11 
Our measure of returns (R) is the raw buy and hold 12 month return beginning in the fourth 
month after the fiscal year end of t-1 and ending 3 months after the fiscal year-end of year t.  
ASSETS are the total assets of the firm at year-end (data #6), SALES GROWTH is defined as 
the percentage increase in current-year sales over the prior year sales (data #12), and 
LEVERAGE is defined as the long-term debt of the firm scaled by total assets (data 
(#9+#34)/#6).  Return on assets (ROA) is defined as earnings before extraordinary items 
dividend by average total assets (data #18/average data #6), earnings-to-price (E/P) is 
earnings before extraordinary items divided by market value of equity at year-end (data 
#18/MVE), and book-to-market (B/M) is defined as the book value of equity at year-end 
divided by MVE (data #60/MVE). 
  Comparing cash method firms to accrual method firms, the data indicate that the cash 
method firms tend to be smaller than the accrual firms both before and after TRA 86, whether 
measured by MVE or by ASSETS.  Most of the other measures are not significantly different 
between cash and accrual firms with a few exceptions.  There is evidence that cash method 
                                                 
11 We also test earnings defined as pre-tax earnings and find similar results described below in section 5.4. 
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firms grew more rapidly and are expected to grow more rapidly than accrual method firms 
before TRA 86 (in terms of mean and median SALES GROWTH and mean book-to-market 
ratios, respectively).  Following TRA 86 cash method firms had higher LEVERAGE than 
accrual method firms.   
  The fact that there are some differences between cash and accrual firms underscores 
the importance of utilizing a natural experiment.  If there had been no exogenous change in 
book-tax conformity and we had merely compared cash method firms to accrual method 
firms, it would be difficult to isolate effects of book-tax conformity on reporting behavior 
given the other differences across the firms.  With the 2 x 2 design in the current study, we are 
able to observe the same cash method firms under two different book-tax conformity regimes, 
essentially giving us a within-firm test.  To control for time-varying industry or macro effects 
we also compare the cash basis firms to a set of accrual method firms in the same pre and 
post-time periods that were not affected by the change in book-tax conformity. 
 
4.3 Empirical Design 
We first examine the difference-in-differences in the long-window earnings response 
coefficient between the cash and accrual basis firms.  Following Francis et al. (2005) and 
others, we interpret the slope coefficient relating returns to earnings obtained from regressions 
of annual returns on annual earnings changes as a measure of the informativeness of earnings.  
Thus, we interpret differences in the slope coefficients between our sub-samples of firms as 
providing evidence on differences in the credibility or informativeness of accounting 
information.  In our case, this difference, if any, is associated with each of the sub-sample’s 
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level of book-tax conformity.12  We use the following regression model:   
tttttt POSTCASHEPOSTECASHEPOSTCASHR *** 654321 ββββββα +∆+∆+∆+++=   
   εβ +∆+ tt EPOSTCASH **7                  (1) 
where CASH is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm is a cash basis firm and zero if 
the firm is an accrual basis firm; POST is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the year of the 
observation is post-TRA 86 (1988-1992) and zero if the observation is prior to TRA 86 (1981-
1985)13; ∆Et and Rt are as defined above.  Using this specification we can investigate whether 
cash firms’ average ERC declined post-TRA 86 more so than the average ERC of the accrual 
firms.  This approach controls for any differential in the post-TRA period for all firms 
attributable to other factors and for any differential in returns between the cash and accrual 
basis firms not attributable to earnings. The main coefficient of interest is the final 
coefficient, 7β .  This represents the incremental effect of being a cash basis firm after TRA 86 
on the relation between reported earnings and returns relative to being a cash basis firm before 
TRA 86 and relative to being an accrual basis firm before and after TRA 86.  Our predicted 
sign for this coefficient is negative—consistent with the information content of earnings 
declining for the cash basis firms from the pre to post TRA 86 period and relative to the 
decline for accrual basis firms.   
 Additional coefficients of interest in this specification include, 3β , which represents 
the ERC for accrual firms prior to TRA 86 and for which we predict a positive sign. The 
                                                 
12 Francis et al. (2005) cite other papers which capture the informativeness of earnings in the coefficient relating 
returns to earnings (e.g., Teoh and Wong, 1993; Imhoff and Lobo, 1992; Warfield et al., 1995; Subramanyam 
and Wild, 1996; Fan and Wong, 2002; and Yeo et al., 2002).  
13 Similar to GMN, we exclude observations from the years 1986 and 1987 because TRA86 was phased in over 
those two years. 
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coefficient 4β  represents the incremental effect of being a cash firm pre-TRA 86 and should 
have a positive sign if cash firms prior to TRA 86 have reported earnings that are more 
informative than earnings of accrual basis firms prior to TRA 86. The coefficient 5β  is the 
incremental effect on the ERC from being an accrual basis firm post-TRA 86, which controls 
for any change in the return-earnings relation for all firms attributable to something other than 
the increase in book-tax conformity required by TRA 86.  We have no prediction on the sign 
of this coefficient. 
We next estimate the basic returns earnings regression for each sub-sample of firm-
years separately (cash basis firms before TRA 86, cash basis firms after TRA 86, accrual basis 
firms before TRA 86, and accrual basis firms after TRA 86) to obtain the regression R2s.  The 
specification is as follows: 
    εβα +∆+= tt ER        (2)                   
where all variables are as defined above. 14    
  We employ randomization techniques to test the significance of the difference in the 
R2s between the four groups.15  To do this we first calculate the difference-in-differences in 
                                                 
14 At first blush, estimating a Basu (1997) type regression may seem to be another plausible way to test our 
research question.  A Basu (1997) regression tests whether accounting earnings are conservative, that is whether 
accounting earnings incorporate economic losses more quickly than economic profits, by testing the return 
response coefficient (under the assumption that returns reflect economic earnings) for loss firms (negative 
returns firms—economic losses) as compared to firms with positive returns.  However, one must be careful 
because in our setting, while we predict that the cash firms become more conservative (consistent with the 
findings in GMN), we would not predict they become more conservative in the sense that they would recognize 
economic losses more quickly.  Rather the cash basis firms in our setting would become more conservative only 
in an effort to reduce tax liabilities and not to reflect a better measure of performance or to reduce the chance of 
a lawsuit.  Thus, the prediction in a Basu (1997) type regression would be that of no difference between the cash 
basis and accrual basis firm-years and due to the small sample and resulting low power in our study, testing a 
null hypothesis prediction is not a strong test.  (Indeed, when we estimate a Basu (1997) regression we find no 
difference between the cash and accrual basis firm-years but because of the low power of the tests we do not 
place much weight on these results.) 
15 We note that while Francis et al. (2005) call tests of R2s an alternative measure of informativeness, they do not 
test the explained variability of the returns-earning relation.  They cite problems comparing R2s across samples 
and the lack of a model that maps signal credibility into the explained variability of the earnings return relation.  
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R2s for the sub-samples by subtracting the R2s from estimating regression (2) over cash basis 
firms in the post-TRA 86 period from the R2s from estimating regression (2) over cash basis 
firms in the pre-TRA 86 period.  We then calculate a similar difference for the accrual basis 
firms. We then subtract the difference in R2s for the accrual basis firm sample from the 
difference in R2s for the cash basis firm sample.  This provides the difference-in-differences 
of the R2s.   
  To test whether this difference-in-differences is significant we estimate the empirical 
distribution under the null hypothesis in which each observation is randomly assigned to one 
of the four groups, while retaining the same relative proportion of each group to the overall 
sample.  In other words, any given firm-year observation is randomly assigned to one of the 
four different groups regardless of their actual identity.  After randomly assigning 
observations to the four groups, we compute the same difference-in-differences between the 
R2s between the four sub-samples as described above.  We repeat this randomization nine 
hundred and ninety-nine times.  The randomization procedure generates a distribution under 
the null hypothesis of no difference in the returns-earnings relation across the four groups. We 
then count the number of times the difference-in-differences in the randomized data is less 
than or equal to the ‘true’ difference-in-differences computed from the actual data to derive 





                                                                                                                                                        
We employ this alternative test, however, because of its wide use in the accounting literature and for 
completeness in our analysis (see Kothari, 2001 for a summary). 
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Difference-in-Differences ERC Regression Test   
Table 3 presents the results of estimating regression equation (1).16  The coefficient on 
the change in earnings, 3β , is significant and positive as expected, indicating that the return-
earnings relation is positive for accrual firms prior to TRA 86.  The coefficient on Cash*∆E, 
4β , is also significantly positive (p=0.0005, one-tailed test) indicating that the cash basis 
firm-years have a greater ERCs relative to the accrual basis firm-years in the pre-TRA 86 
period.  This result is consistent with greater information content of earnings for firms 
allowed to use different accounting methods for book and tax (cash basis firms) relative to 
firms where the income measures are conformed to a greater degree (accrual basis firms).  
This result is similar to the cross-country findings that the information content of earnings is 
greatest in countries with low degrees of book-tax conformity.  However, the result could be 
caused by other differences between these two samples for reasons unrelated to the method of 
accounting used for tax.  To control for these potential differences we focus on the coefficient 
on Cash*Post*∆E, 7β , as our main variable of interest. The coefficient on Post*∆E, 5β , is 
designed to capture any broad changes in information content after TRA 86 and is marginally 
significant (p=0.09, two-tailed test) indicating that the ERC declined for the accrual basis 
firms post-TRA 86.   Our main variable of interest, 7β , is negative and significant (p-value = 
0.0005, one-tailed test) indicating that the cash basis firms exhibit a decline in their ERC after 
TRA 86 that is greater than the decline in the ERC for the accrual basis firms over the same 
                                                 
16 All standard errors for this regression estimation are robust standard errors using the Huber-White correction 
with clustering at the firm level.  Also, for direct estimates of the ERCs for each sub-sample separately see Table 
4.  
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period.  Thus, the evidence is consistent with an increased level of book-tax conformity 
reducing the information content of earnings.   
 
5.2 Difference-in-Differences in R2s 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating equation (2) over each of the four sub-
samples of firm-years separately.  We note that the R2s of the returns on earnings regression 
decreases for the cash basis firm-years by 0.0754 from 0.1583 prior to TRA 86 to 0.0829 after 
TRA 86.  For the accrual basis firm-years we find that the R2s actually increase slightly from 
0.0466 in the pre-TRA 86 period to 0.0689 in the post-period a difference.  Thus, the actual 
difference-in-difference in R2s is -0.0977 (cash basis firms’ decrease less the accrual basis 
firms’ increase (-0.0754- 0.0223)). 
To examine statistical significance of the difference in the R2s we turn to the 
randomization analysis.  The results are presented in Table 5.  As described above, we 
compute out of the nine hundred and ninety-nine times that the data are randomized, how 
many times the difference in R2s changes (measured from post-TRA 86 to pre-TRA 86) 
between the firm-years assigned the ‘cash basis’ label and the firm-years assigned the ‘accrual 
basis’ label is less than (more negative than) the difference in the actual data.  In other words, 
how many times is the randomized data’s difference-in-differences less than or equal to - 
0.0977?  We find that in only 8.6% of the cases using randomized data would we have 
obtained a result similar to that from the actual data.  This percentage can be interpreted 
similar to a p-value: the probability of a difference-in-differences in R2s as large (i.e., as 
negative) as what we observe in our sample happening by chance is less than 10%.     
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Figure 1 graphs the R2s for each group. The R2s from the regression using the cash 
basis firm-years prior to TRA 86 is the largest of any of the four sub-samples at 0.1583 
(versus 0.0829 for cash basis firm-years after TRA 86, 0.0466 for accrual basis firm-years 
before TRA 86, and 0.0689 for accrual basis firm-years after TRA 86) indicating that earnings 
explains more of the variation in returns for this sub-sample relative to the other three sub-
samples of firm-years.  This is consistent with settings of low book-tax conformity being 
associated with high information content of earnings.17   
 
5.3  The Effect of Loss Firms 
 Our hypothesis predicts and the main results show that greater book-tax conformity is 
associated with a loss of information content in reported financial accounting earnings.  The 
results in GMN are consistent with this lower information content in earnings occurring as a 
result of firm management reporting lower financial accounting earnings in order to save 
taxes rather than providing information through earnings.  Because the tax incentives are to 
lower reported financial accounting income, increasing conformity could result in more 
reported financial accounting losses.  Indeed, in the sub-samples of firm-years, 18 (20)  
percent of the cash (accrual) basis firm-years prior to TRA 86 report a loss, 30 (28) percent of 
the cash (accrual) basis firm-years after TRA 86 report a loss, indicating a greater increase in 
reported losses for the cash basis firms relative to the accrual basis firms.   
This differential in rates of loss observations could affect the results.  Hayn (1995) 
shows that the explanatory power and earnings response coefficients are lower for loss 
observations.  To investigate the effect of loss firm observations on our study we re-estimate 
                                                 
17 When we estimate equation (2) in the annual cross-section, the R2 is larger for the cash basis firms than the 
accrual basis firms in each of the 5 annual cross-sections in the pre-TRA 86 period (1981-1985) and in only 2 of 
the 5 annual cross-sections post-TRA 86 (1988-1992). 
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equation (1) after excluding loss observations from the sample and find that the difference-in-
differences interaction term coefficient, 7β  (the coefficient on the interaction of 
CASH*POST*∆E), is still negative and is significant at a p-value of 0.024, one-tailed.  Thus, 
the results are not simply driven by cash basis firms adopting more conservative accounting 
and thus reporting more losses, which have lower ERCs but also by ERCs for firms with 
positive earnings actually declining after conformity increases.18   
 
5.4      Additional Analysis 
In the main specification we do not include additional control variables so that it is 
easier to compare the results to the R2s analysis, which consists of simple regressions of 
returns on earnings changes.  However, to provide additional evidence that the results in 
Table 3 are not affected by correlated omitted variables we include several additional control 
variables in the regression, each interacted with the ∆E variable.  The variables we include are 
1) SIZE (measured as the natural log of total assets (data #6)), 2) the B/M (book-to-market 
ratio) (data #60/ (data #199 * data #25)), 3) ROA (return on assets) (data #18/ the average of 
data #6 in years t and t-1), 4) LEVERAGE ((data #34 + data #9)/ data #6)), and 5) SALES 
GROWTH from year t-1 to year t (data #12 in year t – data item 12 in year t-1/data item 12 in 
year t-1).   
In untabulated tests that include these additional control variables we find that the 
coefficient on 1) SIZE interacted with ∆E is significantly negative (p-value of <0.001), 2) B/M 
                                                 
18 However, if one believes the greater incidence of losses for the cash basis firms is a result of the increase in 
book-tax conformity and the resulting change in incentives for firm management, then even if our results were 
due to the increase in loss observations for the cash-basis firm-years this would not be problematic but rather 
would further exemplify that a consequence of book-tax conformity is that there will be a loss of information to 
market participants.   
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interacted with ∆E is insignificant (p-value of 0.444)19, 3) ROA interacted with ∆E is 
marginally significantly positive (p-value of 0.068), 4) LEVERAGE interacted with ∆E  is 
insignificantly different from zero, and 5) SALES GROWTH interacted with ∆E is 
significantly positive (p-value of 0.044).  With regard to the main variable of interest in the 
difference-in-differences specification ( 7β  in equation (1)) we find that it remains 
significantly negative (p-value of 0.0015, one-tailed) as predicted.20  The remaining 
coefficients in the regression are of similar significance to the reported results in Table 3.   
Because the definition of earnings we use in our analysis, earnings before 
extraordinary items, is after the tax expense on the firm’s income statement, we conduct a 
sensitivity tests using pre-tax earnings (data #170) in place of earnings before extraordinary 
items to make sure the accounting for income taxes before and after TRA 86 does not induce 
our results.  Although there was no explicit change in the accounting standard regarding the 
accounting for income taxes during our sample period, firms’ tax expense could have changed 
significantly because of tax law changes in TRA 86.  Using the revised definition of earnings, 
our results are qualitatively unchanged.  In the ERC difference-in-differences regression 
(Table 3) the coefficient on the main variable of interest is negative and significant (p-value of 
0.0012, one-tailed).  Thus, the results are robust to the use of pre-tax earnings rather than 
earnings before extraordinary items. 
Finally, because there is some evidence of firms shifting income into post-TRA 86 tax 
years in order to take advantage of lower tax rates (Guenther, 1994; Scholes, Wilson and 
Wolfson, 1992), we estimate the difference-in-differences regression by excluding data for the 
                                                 
19 If SALES GROWTH interacted with ∆E is removed from the regression, the book to market interaction term 
becomes significantly negative indicating both proxy for growth. 
20 Again, all standard errors for this regression estimation are robust standard errors using the Huber-White 
correction with clustering at the firm level. 
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tax year 1988 to ensure that the results are not somehow driven by this income shifting.  
Again, we find results consistent with Table 3, the coefficient on the difference-in-difference 
term, β7, is negative and significant with a p-value of 0.0005, one-tailed.  Overall, the main 
inferences of the analysis are unaffected by the inclusion of control variables, the use of pre-
tax earnings as the main regressor, or by the exclusion of tax years to which income may have 
been shifted by firms in response to the lower tax rates implemented in TRA 86. 
 
5.5 Discussion of Self-Selection 
Because firms could choose to be either cash-basis or accrual-basis firms prior to TRA 
86, the reasons why firms chose to be one or the other could affect how they respond to 
increased conformity and perhaps then affect our results (i.e., a self-selection problem).  GMN 
conduct a test for the effects of self-selection using a two stage switching regression and find 
that their results are robust.   
In our empirical tests we use a difference-in-differences approach to examine our 
research question.  This means that, in effect, we are using the same cash basis firm as its own 
control (creating the first difference) while at the same time using a sample of accrual basis 
firm-years as a control for any macro-economic effects occurring around TRA 86 that would 
have caused our results (the second difference).  Because we use a difference-in-differences 
design the reasons why the firm chose (or did not choose) the tax accounting method cannot 
be affecting our results because the firm acts as its own control.  The only case in which the 
firm would not provide a good control for itself would be if the firm changed around the same 
time as TRA 86 and it changed in such a way to affect a factor that impacts earnings response 
coefficients.  From our statistics (Table 2) we note that growth could be one of these 
 25
characteristics.  Our cash-basis firms experience significantly greater SALES GROWTH and 
lower B/M before TRA 86 than after TRA 86.  Because growth is positively associated with 
earnings response coefficients (Collins and Kothari, 1989) the higher growth pre-TRA 86 
could cause the ERCs to be greater pre-TRA 86 and the decrease in growth post-TRA 86 
could cause the ERCs to be lower post-TRA 86.   
However, sensitivity analysis discussed above includes two different proxies for 
growth (both the book-to-market ratio as in Collins and Kothari (1989) and sales growth) in 
the regression as control variables to control for their effect on the earnings response 
coefficient.  Even after including these controls the main results are still significant – meaning 
that the cash basis firms have a significant decrease in their earnings response coefficient 
from the years prior to TRA 86 to the years after TRA 86 and this decrease is bigger than any 
decrease the accrual firms experienced over the same time period even after controlling for 
the effect of growth on the earnings response coefficients.    
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper examines the effect of book-tax conformity on the information content of 
financial accounting earnings.  We use a natural experiment in which a sample of publicly 
traded firms were required to switch from the cash method of accounting to the accrual 
method for tax purposes, thereby increasing the level of conformity between book and taxable 
incomes.  GMN examine this same set of firms and find that after the required change in the 
tax rules these firms deferred more income for financial reporting purposes because of the 
increased trade-off between financial accounting and tax.  In other words, once the two 
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incomes were more closely aligned, the firms reported lower financial accounting earnings, 
all else constant, in order to save (defer) tax dollars.    
 We examine the market’s use of this more closely aligned earnings number.  We 
predict that earnings that are more closely linked to taxable income will be less informative to 
market participants.  We predict that increased conformity reduces the information content of 
earnings because managers will report earnings to minimize taxes rather than convey private 
information about firm performance.   
 We find evidence consistent with our predictions.  Firms that were required to convert 
to the accrual basis method for tax purposes, which increased the level of conformity between 
tax and financial accounting reporting, experienced a decline in long-window ERCs and in the 
explanatory power of earnings for returns in the period following TRA 86.  In order to ensure 
that this decline was not caused by a macroeconomic event that affected all firms, not just 
those subject to the increased conformity requirement of TRA 86, we compare the decline in 
these measures to the changes in the ERC and R2s for a sample of industry-matched firms not 
subject to the conformity changes imposed by TRA 86.  We find that the sample of firms 
required to switch to the accrual basis method for tax purposes had significantly greater 
declines in the long-window ERC and in explanatory power of earnings for returns over the 
same time period.  Thus, the evidence indicates that increasing book-tax conformity tends to 
result in a degradation of the information content of financial reporting earnings. 
 Many proponents of increased book-tax conformity have claimed the easy fix for 
corporate financial misreporting is to eliminate or reduce the differences between book and 
taxable incomes.  From the tax side, another set of proponents makes the same argument in 
terms of constraining aggressive tax reporting.  In both cases the idea is that with stronger 
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conformity firms will have less ability to simultaneously engage in aggressive tax reporting 
and aggressive financial reporting.  While even this claim is debatable (see Hanlon and 
Shevlin 2005), our study provides evidence that the behavioral response to an increase in 
book-tax conformity will result in less informative earnings being reported to shareholders.  A 
loss of information content appears likely even if the tax law is changed to conform with 
GAAP because that is exactly what occurred in the small sample of firms in this study.     
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Cash-Pre is the sub-sample of firm-years 1981-1985 for the cash basis firms (those firms that were 
previously on the cash-basis method for tax purposes and were required to switch to the accrual 
method after TRA 86). Cash-Post is the sub-sample of firm-years 1988-1992 for the cash basis firms 
(after the switch to the accrual method).  Accrual-Pre is the sub-sample of firm-years 1981-1985 for 
the accrual basis firms (those that were on the accrual basis method of accounting for tax purposes 







List of cash basis firms from Guenther, Maydew, and Nutter (1997) sample 94
Less:
   Firms with missing lagged market value of equity and with fiscal year end change 7
Firms with Compustat data in only 1985 or 1988 18
Firms with missing earnings data for either year 2
Firms not on CRSP or with missing returns for either year 8
Firms that have no matching accrual basis firms in the same four digit sic code 3
Total Cash Basis Sample - number of firms 56
Number of firm-years available for the sample of 56 firms for the years
      1981-1985 and 1988-1992 450
Accrual Basis Sample
Firm-years in the Compustat file matching four digit industries as the cash sample with
   1985 sales > $5 million, and observations in both years 1985 and 1988, 4,162
   for years 1981-1985 and 1988-1992
Less: 
Firm-years with missing earnings or return data 586
Less cash basis firm observations 450
Total Accrual Basis Sample -  firm-years (377 firms) 3,126






Cash basis sample includes the firms required to switch from the cash basis method of 
accounting for tax purposes to the accrual basis method following TRA 86.  Guenther, 
Maydew, and Nutter (1997) provide evidence with these firms deferring more financial 
accounting income as a result of the increase in book-tax conformity after this change.  The 
accrual basis sample includes firms in the same industries as the cash basis firms but were 










Pre-TRA 1986 n=211 n=1,475 difference in difference in 
mean median
mean st. dev. 25% median 75% mean st. dev. 25% median 75% p-value p-value
R t 0.213 0.608 -0.191 0.035 0.477 0.159 0.572 -0.236 0.062 0.421 0.2072 0.4012
∆ E t 0.00002 0.099 -0.171 0.011 0.027 0.001 0.163 -0.031 0.006 0.030 0.9083 0.2331
MVE t 137.651 174.253 28.704 68.540 170.965 659.471 1,791.409   22.200 87.120 375.373 0.0001 0.0281
MVE t-1 130.638 190.462 26.690 65.247 144.381 612.556 1,642.174   22.082 80.840 345.557 0.0001 0.0059
ASSETS t 163.739 232.343 31.779 81.298 194.013 803.317 1,904.721   28.746 108.761 509.663 0.0001 0.0121
SALES GROWTH t 0.216 0.329 0.034 0.174 0.338 0.156 0.350 -0.031 0.090 0.242 0.0202 0.0001
E/P t 0.037 0.109 0.029 0.059 0.091 0.007 0.248 0.018 0.059 0.092 0.0021 0.9257
B/M t 0.632 0.421 0.334 0.524 0.803 0.718 0.546 0.366 0.604 0.931 0.0075 0.0313
ROA t 0.057 0.073 0.023 0.058 0.106 0.044 0.097 0.012 0.055 0.101 0.0263 0.1669
LEVERAGE t 0.215 0.200 0.041 0.164 0.338 0.228 0.194 0.070 0.180 0.348 0.3785 0.1870
Post-TRA 1986 n=239 n=1,651
mean st. dev. 25% median 75% mean st. dev. 25% median 75%
R t 0.101 0.532 -0.262 0.001 0.361 0.142 0.520 -0.185 0.074 0.328 0.2498 0.1519
∆ E t 0.043 0.336 -0.039 0.008 0.046 0.032 0.277 -0.033 0.009 0.043 0.6363 0.9790
MVE t 165.050 335.299 18.950 57.780 180.348 1,133.556  3,075.649   23.475 102.830 584.639 0.0001 0.0001
MVE t-1 152.630 283.043 21.556 58.327 179.142 1,001.104  2,633.642   23.144 92.603 515.310 0.0001 0.0001
ASSETS t 271.256 499.650 47.154 120.162 259.721 1,068.964  2,377.849   37.060 159.659 680.636 0.0001 0.0117
SALES GROWTH t 0.075 0.221 -0.044 0.063 0.168 0.095 0.274 -0.026 0.074 0.178 0.2175 0.3644
E/P t -0.101 0.414 -0.044 0.048 0.074 -0.065 0.379 -0.021 0.046 0.077 0.2003 0.5931
B/M t 0.791 0.691 0.353 0.651 1.064 0.749 0.674 0.360 0.609 0.949 0.3640 0.1658
ROA t 0.008 0.104 -0.024 0.026 0.630 0.019 0.109 -0.012 0.034 0.075 0.1489 0.0576
LEVERAGE t 0.286 0.235 0.086 0.240 0.426 0.231 0.201 0.063 0.189 0.355 0.0008 0.0019




This table contains descriptive statistics for the sample. Our measure of earnings (∆E) is the change in earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat data #18) 
from year t-1 to year t, scaled by the market value of equity (MVE, data #199 * data #25) at the end of year t-1. Our measure of returns (R) is the raw buy and 
hold 12 month return beginning in the fourth month after the fiscal year end of t-1 and ending 3 months after the fiscal year-end of year t.  ASSETS are the total 
assets of the firm at year-end (data #6), SALES GROWTH is defined as the percentage increase in current-year sales over the prior year sales (data #12), and 
LEVERAGE is defined as the long-term debt of the firm scaled by total assets  (data (#9+#34)/#6).  Return on assets (ROA) is defined as earnings before 
extraordinary items dividend by average total assets (data #18/average data#6), earnings-to-price (E/P) is earnings before extraordinary items divided by market 
value of equity at year-end (data#18/MVE), and book-to-market (B/M) is defined as the book value of equity at year-end divided by MVE (data #60/MVE).
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Table 3 
Difference-in-Differences Earnings Response Coefficient Tests 
 
tttttt POSTCASHEPOSTECASHEPOSTCASHR *** 654321 ββββββα +∆+∆+∆+++=
     εβ +∆+ tt EPOSTCASH **7                  (1) 
 
Predicted Robust 
Sign Coefficient St. Err T-stat p-value
Intercept 0.158 0.0144 10.96 0.0001
Cash +/- 0.054 0.0370 1.47 0.1430
Post +/- -0.032 0.0176 -1.82 0.069
∆E + 0.763 0.1327 5.75 <0.001
Cash*∆E + 1.712 0.5207 3.29 0.001
Post*∆E +/- -0.268 0.1577 -1.7 0.0900
Cash*Post +/- -0.100 0.0503 -1.98 0.0480
Cash*Post*∆E - -1.740 0.5356 -3.25 0.0005
N 3,576            
R squared 0.069  
 
Cash is an indicator variable set equal to one if the firm is a cash basis firm as defined in Table 1, 
and zero otherwise.  Post is an indicator variable set equal to one for years 1988-1992 (post-TRA 
86) and zero otherwise.  All other variables are as defined previously or interactions of 
previously defined terms.  P-values are one tailed if we have a predicted sign and two-tailed 
where no sign is predicted.  Robust standard errors are computed using Stata's robust command 
and specifying each firm as a cluster.  This statistic is the Huber-White standard errors and fixing 

















OLS Regressions of Returns on Earnings for the Period before TRA 86 and after TRA 86 
and for Cash Basis and Accrual Basis Firms 
 
εβα +∆+= tt ER       (2) 
 
Panel A: Cash Basis Firms
Cash Basis Firm-Years 1981-1985 (N=211) Coefficient St. Err T-stat P value Adj R squared
Intercept 0.213 0.0384 5.53 <0.0001 0.1583
∆Et 2.475 0.3888 6.36 <0.0001
Cash Basis Firm-Years 1988-1992 (N=239) Coefficient St. Err T-stat P value Adj R squared
Intercept 0.081 0.03324 2.43 0.016 0.0829
∆Et 0.467 0.09843 4.75 <0.0001
Panel B: Accrual Basis Firms
Accrual Basis Firm-Years 1981-1985 (N=1,475) Coefficient St. Err T-stat P value Adj R squared
Intercept 0.158 0.01454 10.88 <0.0001 0.0466
∆Et 0.763 0.08922 8.55 <0.0001
Accrual Basis Firm-Years 1988-1992 (N=1,651) Coefficient St. Err T-stat P value Adj R squared
Intercept 0.126 0.01243 10.17 <0.0001 0.0689







All sub-samples and variables are as defined in Tables 1 and 2.  
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Table 5 
Difference-in-Difference Test for R2s: Randomization Test of Significance of R2s  
 
 
Cash basis firm-years (n=450) 
 Actual R2 post-TRA 86 (1988-1992)       0.0829 
 Actual R2 pre-TAR 86 (1981-1985)       0.1583 
 Actual difference (decline)       -0.0754 
 
Accrual basis firm-years (n=3,126) 
 Actual R2 post-TRA 86 (1988-1992)       0.0689 
 Actual R2 pre-TAR 86 (1981-1985)       0.0466 
 Actual difference (increase)        0.0223 
 
Difference in R2 difference of cash firms less the R2 difference of the  
accrual firms: Difference-in-difference R2       -0.0977 
 
Randomization test: 
Randomize (shuffle) firms over all groups (cash basis pre and post TRA 86 and accrual firms pre 
and post TRA 86).  Count how many times the randomized sample has a difference-in-difference 
less than (more negative) or equal to the actual difference-in-difference in R2 from the actual 
data. 
 P-value (one-tailed)             0.086 
 
 
 
 
 
  
